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The concept of a nuclear weapons free area in Northeast Asia wasconceived during the historic period of geopolitical change in1991. Among the many auspicious events transpiring at the time
were the reduction in US nuclear weapon missions and the development
of denuclearization talks between the two Koreas. The earliest
conception of the LNWFZ-NEA was of a body to facilitate the
achievement of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula while building
cooperative security in the broader region. After an initial period of
planning and gaining support for the project, the first presentation to an
international audience was in March of 1992.
1993 saw the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
announce its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, and this had a sobering
effect on many in the international community. It raised concerns about
to the ramifications of increased proliferation in Northeast Asia. In terms
of the embryonic LNWFZ-NEA, it had the effect of reducing opposition
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to such a zone –and this
was a key development.
In 1995, a Senior Panel was created to oversee the formulation of a
LNWFZ-NEA agreement. This body consisted of General officers from
the militaries of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (RoK), Russia,
and the US. The panel was soon expanded to include officials from
Argentina, Canada, Finland, France, and, a little later, Mongolia under
the rubric of the Extended Senior Panel of the LNWFZ-NEA. It was
during the mid-1990s that the proposed zone took elliptical shape
stretching form Taiwan to Alaska, as opposed to the initial proposal of a
circular zone in 1200 nautical miles in radius centered on the Korean
Peninsula demilitarized zone. Recent years have seen a shift away from
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geometrical boundaries to the placement a certain percentage of the
tactical nuclear weapons of each of the nuclear weapon states on the
chopping block.
Throughout the late 1990s, great efforts were taken to determine
how to recognize a zone that included both nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons states, and how momentum could be maintained in the push
toward a nuclear weapons free zone. This led to the formulation of a
three “basket” approach toward achievement of the zone. These baskets
were: first, the structure, characteristics, and other details of the
LNWFZ-NEA, second the confidence building measures necessary to
provide an impetus for some participants to remain members in good-
standing.
The zone would be limited both with respect to geography and
weapon systems. That is, it would not apply to the entire territory of
some member states- notably China, Russia, and US, and it would apply
only to tactical weapons. This has presented problems for the prospects
of advancing the plan. First and foremost among these difficulties is that
it would not be in accordance with the generally accepted definition of
a nuclear weapons free zone. Such definitions require prohibition of all
nuclear weapons (strategic as well as tactical) within all of the territory
of the participating states. Many rail against the notion of a zone that
would not include the most devastating of the weapons and that would
only touch portions of some of the members.
What must be remembered is that the LNWFZ-NEA as it has been
proposed is not meant to create the final once-and-for-all disposition of
the question of nuclear weapons in the region. Instead, it is meant to
break down intractable barriers into tractable hurdles.
Without a period in which relations are established and confidence
built, those who seek an “all-or-none” outcome will perpetually end up
with “none”. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted
in an agreement that was weak on verification and put a number of
nuclear weapon systems beyond consideration of the agreement, and it
has been much decried in the arms control community as a poor
agreement. On the other hand, START I is praised as a model of
verification and “closed loop-holes.” But what we must remember is
that START I was built on confidence established under SALT I. I would
agree that the two parties could not have gone straight to an agreement
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that required the degree of openness seen in the START I Treaty because
they had not established the relationships necessary.
It is also important to remember that it is crucial to include the
nuclear weapon states- China, Russia, and the United States- in the
process of a Northeast Asia zone. There is a chain that must be
considered. The nuclear status of the non-nuclear weapon states depends
on the nuclear postures and doctrines of the nuclear weapon states. For
example, Japan’s continued willingness to forgo nuclear weapons is
influenced by China’s nuclear doctrine and posture; China’s nuclear
policy is influenced by Russia’s and US’s, and so on.
2001 saw the development if a draft treaty constructed by the
members of the ESP that would be submitted for consideration by Track
I negotiators.
As this decade has progressed, the members if the LNWFZ-NEA
have watched the ups and downs of the Six-Party talks, and have been
hopeful that they would be successful. The success of these talks would
go a long way toward achieving the goals espoused by the Extended
Senior Panel and would have a stabilizing effect on the region.
The most recent plenary meeting was in March of 2006 in Shanghai.
This was the 10th such session, not including a number of interim
meetings. The 2006 plenary focused on consideration of confidence
building measures; and it saw a number of breakthroughs.
First, Dr. Yang Xiyu of China’s Foreign Ministry, who drafted the
September 19, 2005 6-Party Talk statement, was able to attend and
participate. Second, the US had an official observer from the State
Department sitting in on the event. Finally, for the first time, the DPRK
had a two-man delegation attend the meetings. In 2006, Dr. Endicott
had two other interactions with representatives from the DPRK
including a March meeting in New York with Ambassador Li Gun of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a December visit to Atlanta by a
two-man delegation headed by Minister Kim Myong Gil from the
DPRK’s UN mission.
I will conclude by speaking about the future of the LNWFZ-NEA.
At present, plans are underway to hold the 11th plenary meeting in Tokyo,
Japan on October 1st- 3rd of this year. The selection of Tokyo as a venue
is meant to reiterate support for those who wish to continue Japan’s
policy of remaining a nuclear weapons free state. The October plenary
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will examine ways to maintain the viability of the LNWFZ-NEA concept
and its objectives, as well as creative means to give forward momentum
to these efforts. The meeting will consider the relative merit of using
the label “regional nonproliferation regime” versus “limited nuclear
weapons free zone” to advance the objectives optimally. Also, Sam Nunn
Research Fellow Michael Shannon will present research findings on the
configuration of the verification regime that would be most politically,
economically, and technically feasible for ensuring the legitimacy of the
LNWFZ-NEA. Mike is a nuclear engineer with technical expertise in
the science of verification who just finished the year long Seminar on
Science, Technology, and International Security that teaches select
scientists and engineers at Georgia Tech about policy development and
analysis.
